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Abstract—Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging
networking paradigm being considered as a possible replacement
for the current IP-based host-centric Internet infrastructure.
CCN focuses on content distribution, which is arguably not well
served by IP. Named-Data Networking (NDN) is an example of
CCN. NDN is also an active research project under the NSF
Future Internet Architectures (FIA) program. FIA emphasizes
security and privacy from the outset and by design. To be a viable
Internet architecture, NDN must be resilient against current and
emerging threats.
This paper focuses on distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks; in particular we address interest flooding, an attack that
exploits key architectural features of NDN. We show that an
adversary with limited resources can implement such attack,
having a significant impact on network performance. We then
introduce Poseidon: a framework for detecting and mitigating
interest flooding attacks. Finally, we report on results of extensive
simulations assessing proposed countermeasure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is an amazing success story, connecting hun-
dreds of millions of users. The way people access and utilize
it has changed radically since the 1970-s when its architecture
was conceived. Today, the Internet has to accommodate new
services, new usage models and new access technologies.
Users are increasingly mobile, constantly accessing – and
contributing to – remote information using a variety of devices
such as laptops and smartphones. Ever-increasing mobility,
device heterogeneity, as well as massive amounts of user-
generated content and social networking are exposing the
limits of the current Internet architecture.
To this end, there are some recent research efforts [23],
[33], [22], [24], [7] with the long-term goal of designing
and deploying a next-generation Internet architecture. One
such new architecture is Named Data Networking (NDN).
It is based on the principle of Content-Centric Networking,
where content – rather than hosts – occupies the central role
in the communication architecture. NDN is one of the five
NSF-sponsored Future Internet Architectures (FIA) [12]; like
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the rest, it is an on-going research effort. NDN is primar-
ily oriented towards efficient large-scale content distribution.
Rather than establishing direct IP connections with a host
serving content, NDN consumers directly request (i.e., express
interest in) pieces of content by name; the network is in
charge of finding the closest copy of the content, and of
retrieving it as efficiently as possible. This decoupling of
content and location allows NDN to efficiently implement
multicast, content replication and fault tolerance. One of the
key goals of the NDN project is “security by design”. In
contrast to today’s Internet, where security problems were (and
are still being) identified along the way, the NSF FIA program
(for all of its projects) stresses both awareness of issues and
support for features and countermeasures from the outset. To
this end, this paper investigates distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks in NDN. DDoS attacks are considered to pose
serious threats to the current Internet. NDN is not immune to
them and might actually offer avenues for new DDoS attacks.
In NDN, each content consumer’s request (called an “inter-
est”) causes NDN routers to store a small amount of transient
state, which is flushed as the content is routed back to the
consumer. This has been pointed out in previous work as a
plausible attack vector – under the name of interest flooding
attack [13], [31].
Motivated by the importance of addressing security in the
early stages of a potential new Internet architecture, we focus
on DDoS over NDN, specifically, using interest flooding
attack. We believe that interest flooding attack and counter-
measures deserve an in-depth investigation before NDN can
be considered ready for large-scale deployment. While some
preliminary results of this research appeared in [8], in the
current paper we show, via extensive simulations, that interest
flooding attacks are not just theoretical. It is, in fact, relatively
easy to perform interest flooding with rather limited resources.
We simulate interest flooding over a realistic topology [15]:
the AT&T network. We focus on reactive countermeasures
and propose techniques for early detection of interest flooding.
(This was left as an open problem in [13].) We then describe
the design and implementation of Poseidon – a framework
for local and distributed interest flooding attack mitigation.
Finally, we report on the effectiveness of proposed methods.
Organization. We present NDN in Section II and interest
flooding in Section III. Section IV details our simulation
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environment and Section V evaluates the impact of interest
flooding attack in our setup. Section VI presents our coun-
termeasure, evaluated in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII
overviews related work and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. NDN OVERVIEW
NDN supports two types of messages: interests and con-
tent [5]. A content message includes a name, a payload and a
digital signature computed by the content producer. Names
are composed of one or more components, which have a
hierarchical structure. In NDN notation, “/” separates name
components, e.g., /cnn/politics /frontpage. Content is
delivered to consumers only upon explicit request. Each re-
quest corresponds to an interest message. Unlike content,
interests are not signed. An interest message includes a name
of requested content. In case of multiple content under a given
name, optional control information can be carried within the
interest to restrict desired content. Content signatures provide
data origin authentication.
NDN routers forward interests towards the content producer
responsible for the requested name, using name prefixes for
routing. Each NDN router maintains a Pending Interest Table
(PIT) – a lookup table containing outstanding [interest,arrival-
interfaces] entries. When an NDN router receives an interest,
it first looks up its PIT to determine whether another interest
for the same name is currently outstanding. There are three
possible outcomes: (1) If the same name is already in the
router’s PIT and the arrival interface of the present interest is
already in the set of arrival-interfaces of the corresponding
PIT entry, the interest is discarded. (2) If a PIT entry for the
same name exists, yet the arrival interface is new, the router
updates the PIT entry by adding a new interface to the set.
The interest is not forwarded further. (3) Otherwise, the router
creates a new PIT entry and forwards the present interest.
Upon receipt of the interest, the producer injects content
into the network, thus satisfying the interest. The requested
content is then forwarded towards the consumer, traversing
– in reverse – the path of the corresponding interest. Each
router on the path deletes the PIT entry corresponding to the
satisfied interest. In addition, each router may cache a copy
of forwarded content in its local Content Store (CS). A router
that receives an interest for already-cached content does not
forward the interest further; it simply returns cached content
and retains no state about the interest.
Not all interests result in content being returned. If an
interest encounters either a router that cannot forward it
further, or a content producer that has no such content, no error
packets are generated. PIT entries for unsatisfied interests in
intervening routers are removed after a predefined expiration
time. The consumer can choose whether to regenerate the same
interest after a timeout.
III. INTEREST FLOODING
It is easy to see that an adversary can take advantage of CS
and PIT – two features unique to NDN – to mount DoS/DDoS
attacks specific to NDN. We focus on attacks that exploit
the PIT, in particular, rapid generation of large numbers of
interests that saturate the victim router’s PIT. Once the PIT
is completely full, all subsequent incoming (un-collapsible)
interests are dropped. Flooding an NDN router with interests
saturates its PIT if the rate of incoming interests is higher than
the rate at which entries are removed from the PIT, either due
to returning content or expiration. This is the goal of interest
flooding attacks.
There are several analogies between well-known SYN
flooding [32] and interest flooding. In a SYN flooding attack,
the adversary’s goal is to consume resources on the victim host
by initiating a large number of TCP connections. This requires
the victim to keep state for each connection for a relatively
long time. The main difference between SYN flooding and
interest flooding attacks is the victim: the primary victims of
interest flooding are routers. End-hosts are secondary victims.
As observed in [13], there are at least three ways to mount
this attack. The adversary can issue closely-spaced interests
for: (1) existing static content; (2) dynamically-generated
content; or (3) non-existent content. In the rest of this paper,
we refer to interests for non existing content as fake interests.
In strategy (1), the adversary requests distinct content to
avoid interest collapsing. If the flooding rate is sufficiently
high, the producer (or, possibly, a router past the victim) will
start dropping packets. This causes interests to linger in the
victim’s PIT until they expire, Depending on the victim’s
ability to satisfy interests quickly (and flush them from the
PIT), this strategy may be very expensive. Also, router caches
might lower the impact of this attack, satisfying adversary’s
requests before they reach the victim.
Strategy (2) is similar to (1), except that content is never
returned from caches. Also, (2) may impose more load on the
producer, due to the increased number of requests for content
that can not be precomputed. This could cause higher round-
trip latency and higher rate of dropped packets, which forces
adversary’s interests to remain in the victim’s PIT longer.
Strategy (3) allows the adversary to create entries in the
victim’s PIT for which no content will ever be returned. This
has several consequences: i) Adversarial interests referring to
non-existent content are stored in the victim’s PIT until they
expire. ii) The maximum rate of adversarial interests does not
depend on the bandwidth allocated by the victim to content
packets, or on the adversary’s ability to receive content. iii)
Adversarial interests cannot be satisfied by router caches, since
they request non-existing content. iv) If constructed properly
(for example, a with random component at the end of each
name) adversarial interests are never collapsed. These effects
allow the adversary to efficiently fill up the victim router’s
PIT, which makes this attack more dangerous than (1) or (2).
Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we focus on (3) – interest
flooding via fake interests.
It is straightforward to construct interests that are routed
through the victim. Let R be the router advertising names-
pace /nsf/fia/. If the adversary issues interests for
/nsf/fia/rnd (where “rnd” is a random string), they are
forwarded through R.
IV. EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT
We use simulations to quantify effects of both attacks and
countermeasures. In particular, we run CCNx over NS-3 [25]
via DCE. CCNx [4] is the official implementation of NDN,
originally developed by PARC, and released as open-source
project in 2009. Even though CCNx codebase is still in early
stage of development, it provides all basic functionalities
of NDN. CCNx currently runs as an overlay on top of IP.
Direct Code Execution [11] (DCE) is a framework developed
by INRIA to allow regular applications to access a network
environment simulated using NS-3. DCE allows us to test the
latest CCNx, without reimplementing it for NS-3.
We emphasize that running simulations of NDN as an
overlay (over IP) reflects the status of the current CCNx imple-
mentation. In fact, even in the official NDN testbed [23], links
between routers are essentially Generic Routing Encapsulation
(GRE) tunnels carrying UDP packets.
Our experiments are performed over the AT&T network
topology shown in Figure 1. We use Rx, Cx, Px, and Ax
to denote the x-th router, consumer, producer, and adversary-
controlled node, respectively. Continuous lines in Figure 1
indicate connections between routers; dashed lines denote con-
nections between consumers and routers; dotted lines represent
connections between producers and routers. Our setup includes
16 (honest) consumers and 2 producers.
We first analyze the topology without any adversarial traffic.
This provides us with a baseline. Each consumer issues
interests for content produced by P0 and P1. Interests re-
trieve distinct pieces of non-existent content; therefore, routers
cannot collapse them or satisfy them via cached content.
Consumers send a short burst of 30 interests, spaced by 2 ms,
at time t = 1 s of the simulation. Starting from t = 1.2 s,
consumers switch to a rate of one interest every 10.7 ms.
In our configurations, such interest spacing allows routers to
forward interests roughly at the same rate at which they receive
content packets. We set routers’ PIT size to 120 KB, while the
interest expiration time was set to the default timeout of 4 s.
We report the average of the various runs in Figure 2. In
particular, Figure 2(a) shows the total number of contents (y-
axis) received by the different routers (x-axis), while Figure
2(b) shows PIT usage (y-axis) as a function of simulation
time (x-axis). The maximum value on the y-axis for 2(b)
corresponds to the total space available in the PITs (120 KB).
Also, the two vertical lines (at 1 s and 26 s) indicate the instant
when consumers start and stop sending interests. (The same
notation is used in all graphs that refer to PIT usage reported
in this paper.)
V. ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS
We assume that the adversary is able to corrupt a portion of
the consumers, through which it implements the attack – i.e.,
issues fake interests. However the adversary is not allowed
to control routers. We believe that this restriction is realistic
and well represents the current scenario of DDoS attacks
(e.g., [17]). While we do not exclude that attacks might come
from internal routers, we leave the investigation of this as
future work.
In our simulations we observe that successful instantiation
of interest flooding requires very small amount of bandwidth.
The adversary controls the nodes connected through a red solid
line in Figure 1. The three adversarial nodes (A0, A1, A2) send
interests for non-existent content for the namespace registered
by P0 – i.e., all fake interests are routed to P0. Similar to
honest nodes, the adversary starts sending interests at t =
1 s. Fake interests are generated every 1.337 ms. Behavior of
honest consumers is unchanged from the base scenario.
Attack results are plotted in Figure 3 for some representative
nodes in both topologies. In particular, Figure 3(a) shows
the ratio of content packets forwarded during the attack with
respect to the same network with no malicious traffic. Figure
3(b) shows PIT usage.
Figure 3(a) demonstrates that the attack has significant
impact on the network: several routers forward 20% of the
original traffic.
It is important to note that consumers are spread all over the
network and the number of adversaries is quite small (three
for both topologies). However, attack impact is significant:
fraction of packets forwarded by routers varies between 25%
and 80% with respect to the base-line scenario. Differences
in the effectiveness of the attack for different routers can
be explained by their distance from the adversary-producer
paths. We emphasize that reduced bandwidth available to
consumers can only be attributed to high PIT usage, as shown
in Figure 3(b). It is easy to see that the fraction of traffic
forwarded by routers drops significantly once PITs fill up. As
confirmed by Figure 3(b), R3 (closest to P0) is the first to
succumb (reaching its PIT limit). This can be attributed to the
central role R3 occupies in the topology.
VI. OUR COUNTERMEASURE: POSEIDON
We now discuss countermeasures for IFA. We focus on
countermeasures that consist in a detection and a reaction
phase. Detection can be local or distributed (collaborative).
In the former, routers rely only on local metrics (e.g., PIT
usage, rate of unsatisfied interests, amount of bandwidth
used to forward content) to identify an attack. In the latter,
nearby routers collaborate to determine whether an attack is
in progress and how to mitigate it.
In case of successful interest flooding attack, the victim
router can easily identify an attack by observing whether its
PIT is full or whether the bandwidth allocated to forwarding
of content is very small. However, it may not be possible for a
router on the path to the victim to detect an attack in progress.
Collaborative detection mechanisms allow routers to exchange
information about their state, with the goal of detecting an
attack in progress as soon – and as close to the adversary
– as possible. With collaborative detection, routers not only
exchange information about the existence of an attack, but
also the (locally detected) properties of such attack: strategies
can take into account feedback from multiple routers.
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Fig. 3. Interest Flooding Attack (IFA): impact over baseline
In this paper, we consider a particular collaborative ap-
proach – known as push-back [13] – to counter interest
flooding. We call our implementation Poseidon, and we discuss
it in the rest of the paper. Poseidon is a set of algorithms that
run on routers, with the goal of identifying traffic anomalies
(especially, interest flooding) and mitigate their effects. Po-
seidon continuously monitors per-interface rates of unsatisfied
interests with respect to overall traffic. If these rates change
significantly between two consecutive time intervals, it sets a
filter on the offending interface(s) (which reduces the number
of incoming interests). Additionally, Poseidon can issue a
push-back “alert” message to the same interfaces, to signal
that an interest flooding attack is in progress.
Poseidon keeps several statistics on expired interests. In
particular, for each of them it records namespace and incom-
ing/outgoing interfaces information. Relatively common net-
work phenomenon (e.g., packet loss) and regular applications
behavior usually account for only a (relatively) small amount
of expiring interests in routers’ PITs.
In the next sections we introduce the detection and reaction
phases of Poseidon. Notation used is shown in Table I.
R set of all routers in the network running Poseidon
ri i-th router, 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|
rji j-th interface on router ri
tk k-th time interval
ω(rji , tk) rate between incoming interest and outgoing
content for a given interface rji
ρ(rji , tk) PIT space used by interests arrived on interface
rji , measured at the end of interval tk
Ω(rji ) interest flooding detection threshold for ω(r
j
i , tk)
P(rji ) interest flooding detection threshold for ρ(r
j
i , tk)
TABLE I
NOTATION.
A. Detection Phase
Attacks are detected using two parameters: ω(rji , tk), and
ρ(rji , tk). The former represents the number of incoming
interests divided by the number of outgoing content packets,
observed by a router ri on its interface r
j
i within time interval
tk:
ω(rji , tk) =
(# of interests from rji at interval tk)
(# of content packets to rji at interval tk)
.
ρ(rji , tk) indicates the number of bytes used to store interests
in PIT, coming from interface rji within time interval tk.
Poseidon detects an attack when both ω(rji , tk) and ρ(r
j
i , tk)
exceed their respective thresholds Ω(rji ) and P(r
j
i ). The de-
tection algorithm is executed at fixed time intervals – typically
every 60 ms – and in the presence of particular events, (i.e.,
push-back messages, as detailed below).
The parameter ω(rji , tk) is a good representation of the
ability of routers to satisfy incoming interests in a particular
time interval. (This is also confirmed by our experiments,
detailed in Section VII.) In particular, ω(rji , tk) > 1 indicates
that the number of content packets forwarded to rji is smaller
than the number of interests coming from the same interface.
However, a small bursts of (either regular or non-satisfiable)
interests may not be caused by an attack. Hence, taking into
account only ω(rji , tk) (i.e., not considering ρ(r
j
i , tk)) may
cause the detection algorithm to report a large number of false
positives. Applying countermeasures may, in this case, produce
negative effects to the overall network performance.
We argue that neither increasing Ω(rji ), nor computing
ω(rji , tk) over longer intervals, produces the indented effects.
In fact, in the first case the bound must be set high enough
to avoid classification of short burst of interests as attacks;
however this could inevitably lead to late- or mis-detection of
actual attacks. Increasing the size of the interval over which
Ω(rji ) is computed may reduce the sensitivity of Poseidon to
short burst of interests. An interval length similar or longer
than the average round-trip time of interest/content packet, in
fact, may allow (part of) the content requested by the burst to
be forwarded back, reducing ω(rji , tk) to a value closer to 1.
However this could significantly increase the detection time.
Instead, to improve detection accuracy (distinguishing natu-
rally occurring burst of interests from attacks), Poseidon takes
into account also ρ(rji , tk). This value measures the PIT space
used by interests coming from a particular interface. This
allows Poseidon to maintain the number of false positives
low – when compared to considering solely ω(rji , tk) – while
allowing it to detect low-rate interest flooding. In a low-rate
interest flooding attack the adversary limits the rate of fake
interests to keep ω(rji , tk) below its thresholds. Monitoring
the content of the PIT allows Poseidon to observe the effects
of the attack, rather than just its causes, allowing for early
detection.
To sum up, different parameters monitored by Poseidon act
as weights and counterweights for interest flooding detection.
When a router is unable to satisfy incoming interests over
a relatively short period, ρ(rji , tk) may exceed the detection
threshold but ω(rji , tk) will not; when the router receives a
short bursts of interests, ω(rji , tk) may become larger than
Ω(rji ) but the PIT usage will likely be within normal values.
To stay undetected, an adversary willing to perform interest
flooding must therefore: (1) reduce the rate at which it sends
interests, which limits the effects of the attack; and/or (2)
restrict the attack to short burst, which makes the attack
ineffective.
Thresholds Ω(rji ) and P(r
j
i ) are not constant and may
change over time to accommodate different conditions of the
network. As an example, push-back messages described below
provide input for determining more appropriate values for
these thresholds.
B. Reaction Phase
Once an interest flooding attack from interface rji of router
ri has been identified, Poseidon limits the rate of incoming
interests from that interface. The original rate is restored once
all detection parameters fall again below their corresponding
thresholds.
With collaborative countermeasures, once a router detects
adversarial traffic from a set of interfaces it limits their rate
and issues an alert message on each of them. An alert message
is an unsolicited content packet which belongs to a reserved
namespace (“/pushback/alerts/” in our implementation),
used to convey information about interest flooding attack in
progress. There are two reasons for using content packets
rather than interests for carrying push-back information: (1)
during an attack, the PIT of the next hop connected to the
offending interface may be full, and therefore the alert message
may be discarded; and (2) content packets are signed, while
interests are not. This allows routers to determine whether an
alert message is legitimate.
Routers running Poseidon do not process alert messages as
regular content: alerts are not checked against PIT content and
are not forwarded any further. The payload of an alert packet
contains: the timestamp corresponding to the alert generation
time; the new (reduced) rate at which offending interests
will be accepted on the incoming interface; and detailed
information about the attack – such as the namespace(s) used
in malicious interests.
Router ri receiving a packet msg processes it as detailed in
Algorithm 1. A persistent interest flooding attack on router ri
causes it to send multiple alert messages towards the source(s)
of the attack. Such sources will decrease their thresholds Ω(rji )
and P(rji ) until they detect the attack and implement rate-
limiting on the malicious interests. If no attack is reported for
a predefined amount of time, thresholds are restored to their
original values.
This push-back mechanism allows routers that are not the
target of the attack, but are unwittingly forwarding malicious
interests, to detect interest flooding early. In particular, alert
messages allow routers to detect interest flooding even when
they are far away from the intended victim – i.e., close to
nodes controlled by the adversary, where countermeasures are
most effective.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section we report on experimental evaluation of coun-
termeasures presented in Section VI. Our countermeasures are
tested over the same topology used in previous experiments
and detailed in Figure 1. Each router implements detection
techniques discussed in Section VI-A and countermeasures
from Section VI-B. As for the parameters used in our ex-
periments, we considered these initial values: for each router
ri, interface r
j
i , Ω(r
j
i ) = 3 and P(r
j
i ) = 1/8 of the PIT size.
Furthermore, we set scaling factor s = 2 and wait time to
60 ms. The Decrease function divides the threshold in input by
s at each invocation. Similarly, the Increase function increases
its input by 1/8 of the current value. Consumers request the
same content at the same rate as in the previous simulations.
Similarly, the nodes controlled by the adversary implement
interest flooding as in the simulation in Section V.
Local Countermeasures. Figure 4(a) shows the result of
local countermeasures. Values shown represent the average of
Algorithm 1: MessageProcessing
input : Incoming packet msg from rji ; wait time;
Ω(rji ); P(r
j
i ); Scaling factor s; Alert message m
from interface rji
1: if msg is ContentObject then
2: process msg as ContentObject and return
3: end if
4: if msg is AlertMessage then
5: if Verify(msg.signature) and IsFresh(msg) and
time from last Alert received from rji > wait time
then
6: // Push-back reaction
7: Decrease(Ω(rji ), s)
8: Decrease(P(rji ), s)
9: else
10: drop msg and return
11: end if
12: end if
13: if msg is Interest then
14: if ω(rji , tk) > Ω(r
j
i ) and ρ(r
j
i , tk) > P(r
j
i ) then
15: drop msg
16: if time from last Alert sent on interface rji >
wait time then
17: send Alert to rji
18: end if
19: else
20: process msg as Interest
21: end if
22: end if
20 executions. Figure 5 reports the ratio of content packets
received with respect to the scenario with no adversary. (For
comparison purposes, in the same figure we also report the
corresponding value with no countermeasures in place.)
Our results show that the rate-based (local) countermeasure
– while simple – is very effective (see Figure 5): under attack,
the performances with the countermeasures increases by some
50% for most routers (e.g., see R30), when compared to
the situation with the attack and no countermeasures. The
impact of the adversary is now more limited: the attack only
reduces the traffic by some 50% for most. In contrast, without
any countermeasure the adversary was able to reduce content
traffic by about 80%. Figure 4(a) report PIT usage over the
same experiments, for some representative routers. Our results
also show that this countermeasure significantly reduces the
PIT usage in presence of an adversary. The effects of the rate-
based approach are evident at t = 6 s, when fake interests
corresponding to the initial phase of the attack – those that
triggered the detection – expire. This shows that the detection
time for the attack is around one second.
Distributed Countermeasures. Figure 5 show the ratio of
content packets received under attack with the the push-
back countermeasure in place. To simplify comparison, we
report the results of the simulations of the attack without
countermeasures and with the previous (local) countermeasure.
The push-back mechanism offers visibly better performance
compared to the rate-based countermeasure: for several routers
the improvement with respect to the local countermeasure is
over 300%.
A similar conclusion applies also to the PIT usage – which is
another measure for attach effectiveness. In fact, it is possible
to observe a significant benefits of push-back comparing
Figure 4(a) to Figure 4(b), e.g. for the PIT of router R31.
So far we have considered cumulative results for throughput;
however, it is interesting to analyze also how the content
packets throughput varies over time in different scenarios.
Figure 6 shows the effect of our push-back countermeasure
on a router (R4), which we deem notable in our topology. This
figure clearly illustrates that using the distributed (push-back)
countermeasure, routers are able to provide roughly the same
throughput measured without interest flooding.
An interesting phenomenon highlighted by Figure 6(b) is
the cyclical behavior of the amount of bandwidth available to
content. This pattern can be explained as follows. As soon
as the PITs of these routers are filled up with fake interests,
no legitimate interests are forwarded and therefore no content
is routed back. After four seconds – i.e., in our setting, the
lifetime of an unsatisfied interest – fake interests are removed
from the PITs allowing routers to forward new (legitimate)
requests for content. When this happens, the adversary is
quickly able to fill up PITs again. This process continues
indefinitely for the whole duration of the attack.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There is lots of previous work on DoS/DDoS attacks on
the current Internet infrastructure. Current literature addresses
both attacks and countermeasures on the routing infrastruc-
ture [16], packet flooding [19], reflection attacks [26], DNS
cache poisoning [27] and SYN flooding attacks [32]. Proposed
countermeasures are based on various strategies and heuristics,
including: anomaly detection [3], packet filtering [30], IP
trace back [21], [29], ISP collaborative defenses [6] and
user-collaborative defenses [14]. The authors of [13] present
a spectrum of possible DoS/DDoS attacks in NDN. They
classify those attacks in interest flooding and content/cache
poisoning, and provide a high-level overview of possible
countermeasures. However, the paper does not analyze specific
attacks or evaluate countermeasures.
NDN caching performance optimization has been recently
investigated with respect to various metrics including energy
impact [18], [28], [20]. The work of Xie, et al. [34] address
cache robustness in NDN. This work introduces CacheShield,
a proactive mechanism that helps routers to prevent caching
unpopular content and therefore maximizing the use of cache
for popular one. To address the same attack, Conti et al [9]
introduce a lightweight reactive mechanism for detecting cache
pollution attacks.
Afanasyev et al. independently address interest flooding
in [1]. Their work confirms the feasibility of interest flooding
attack, and the need for an effective countermeasure. Inter-
estingly, this work can be considered complementary to ours,
both in terms of attack evaluation and countermeasures. In
fact, while our experiments rely on the official NDN imple-
mentation [4], the work in [1] used NDNsim [2]. Although
both approaches provide valuable insights into the attack, we
argue that using the actual NDN code may result in a more
accurate assessment.
A slightly different approach has been proposed by Dai et
al. in [10]. Their technique relies on the collaboration between
routers and producers in charge of the namespaces to which
fake interests are directed.
In [31], Wa¨hlisch et al. independently investigate how data-
driven state can be used to implement various DoS/DDoS
attacks. Relevant to our work, their analysis includes: resource
exhaustion, which is analogous to our interest flooding attack;
mobile blockade, in which a wireless node issues a large
number of interests and then disconnects from the network,
causing the returned content to consume a large portion of the
shared network bandwidth; and state decorrelation attacks, in
which an adversary issues updates of local content or cache
appearances at a frequency that exceeds the content request
routing convergence. Attacks are tested on two physical (i.e.,
not simulated) topologies comprised of three and five NDN
routers.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we discussed interest flooding-based DDoS
over NDN. We provided, to the best of our knowledge, the
first experimental evaluation of the attack. Our experiments are
based on the official NDN implementation codebase; we argue
that this setup provides reliable results, and closely mimics the
behavior of physical (non-simulated) networks.
We demonstrated that interest flooding attack is a realistic
threat; in particular, we showed that an adversary with limited
resources can reduce the amount of bandwidth allocated for
content objects to 15-25% of the total bandwidth. We then
introduced Poseidon, a new mechanism for detecting and
mitigating interest flooding. Poseidon relies on both local
metrics and collaborative techniques for early detection of
interest flooding. We showed that the benefits of Poseidon are
significant: in fact, most routers running our countermeasure
are able to use more than 80% of the available bandwidth
during the attack.
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